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In acquiring the same intermediate inputs, a firm often conducts bi-sourcing, i.e., 
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I.Introduction
To produce outputs, a firm typically adopts outsourcing in acquiring inter-
mediate inputs, i.e., buying components from external suppliers. However, in
reality, a firm often chooses to acquire the same component by both buying from
external suppliers and self-producing in an internal component manufacturer
owned by the firm. We call it bi-sourcing as it contains both outsourcing and
insourcing. For example, Nokia purchases a large proportion of key electronic
components such as semiconductors and microprocessors from a global network
of suppliers. At the same time, Nokia operates about ten manufacturing plants
in nine countries to produce these components.
Why do firms conduct bi-sourcing? In outsourcing, the external compo-
nent supplier keeps ownership and control over assets for upstream production.
According to the property rights theory (Grossman and Hart, 1986), this can
stimulate the incentive of the external supplier to improve productivity; how-
ever, it also generates the potential holdup problem in arm’s-length trading
relationship as the external supplier may threaten not to fulfill the contract
obligations so as to capture a larger share of total surplus. Bi-sourcing can
mitigate the holdup problem to a substantial extent. In negotiating with the
external supplier, the firm can use the backup option of the internal supplier to
minimize the holdup problem. Once holdup problem occurs, the components
from the internal supplier can help avoid a halt to the production process.
At the same time, bi-sourcing can keep to a large degree the incentive of
external supplier to improve productivity. The presence of an external supplier
can further mitigate the internal supplier’s problem of lack of incentive. As a
result, the firm enjoys a better bargaining position in bi-sourcing than in out-
sourcing. This stimulates the firm to supply headquarter services, which in turn
promotes the component supply and total output through the complementarity
effect. Thus, bi-sourcing achieves a higher profitability than outsourcing does.
In our example, Nokia finds that outsourcing allows it to secure inputs produced
with the state-of-the-art technology, but it also involves the risk that the timely
delivery of quality components may not be guaranteed. Bi-sourcing allows Nokia
to strike a balance between the quality and the security of component supply.
II.Model Setup
A firm with headquarter H combines headquarter services (h) with compo-
nent inputs (m) to produce final goods. The production generates revenue
function R = f(h,m) that has the following characteristics: (1) ∂f∂h ≥ 0,
∂2f
∂h2 < 0;
∂f
∂m ≥ 0,
∂2f
∂m2 < 0; (2) f(0, .) = 0, f(., 0) = 0;and (3)
∂2f
∂h∂m >
0, ∂
3f
∂h∂m2 < 0,
∂3f
∂h2∂m < 0. Condition (3) indicates the complementarity be-
tween the two inputs h and m, but the degree of complementarity decreases
in both inputs. Meanwhile, each unit of both inputs requires one unit of labor
to produce. For simplicity, the wage rate is normalized to 1. Moreover, the
investments in m and h are completely specific to the trading relationship so
that they have no value outside the relationship. There are three periods in the
model. At time 0, H chooses between outsourcing and bi-sourcing. Ex ante
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investments in input production are made at date 1, and m is supplied and
combined with h at date 2. There is ex ante uncertainty about component type
so that it is infeasible to make an effective long-term contract. As investments
in input production are irreversible and noncontractible, the parties negotiate
about the component type and price at date 2 from scratch.
III.Single Outsourcing
For simplicity, we consider one external supplier for the outsourcing scenario
and call it single outsourcing. 1At date 1, the headquarter (H) signs a contract
with an external supplierM1 to purchase intermediate goods m1, and combines
it with h to produce final goods and generate revenue R1 = f(h,m1). At date 2,
they bargain over the distribution of the surplus from the trading relationship by
following the generalized Nash bargaining procedure. In bilateral negotiation, H
andM1 have bargaining power of β1 and 1−β1 respectively. Given that trading
is efficient, Nash bargaining leads to thatH gets β1R1 andM1 gets (1−β1)R1. H
andM1 choose h andm1 to maximize β1R1−h and (1−β1)R1−m1 respectively.
IV.Bi− Sourcing
In bi-sourcing, the headquarter (H) purchases the intermediate inputs from
both the external (M1) and internal (M2) suppliers. Let R = f(h,m), R1 =
f(h,m1) and R2 = f(h,m2) denote the total revenues when both M1 and M2,
only M1, and only M2 provide component inputs, respectively, where m =
m1 + m2. Following the property rights literature, we assume that ex post
bargaining occurs both under outsourcing and under insourcing, that is, H
negotiates with the external and internal component suppliers (M1 and M2)
respectively. The bargaining power distribution between H and M1 remains
the same as before, while H and M2 have bargaining power of β2 and 1 − β2
respectively. Following Antras and Helpman (2004), we assume that H has
a higher bargaining power with respect to M2 than with respect to M1, i.e.,
β2 > β1. This is a realistic assumption: as long as a component supplier does
not have some unique production capability that can hardly be replaced, H
tends to have stronger bargaining power when she owns the supplier and enjoys
the residual control rights or authority.
At the beginning of date 1, H announces the bargaining procedure, i.e.,
whether she will negotiate first with M2 and then M1 or the other way around.
We consider the former case first. Using the backward deduction approach, we
first look at the bargaining game between H andM1. Before that negotiation is
started, H has already finished the negotiation with M2, securing a component
supply of m2 and paying P2 to M2. Consequently, in negotiating with M1,
H expects to obtain R − P1 − P2 if the trading is carried out but gets the
disagreement option value R2 − P2 if negotiation breaks down, whereas M1
obtains a transfer payment P1 fromH if trading is conducted and zero otherwise.
As trading is efficient, Nash bargaining determines the division of social surplus
1Having two external component suppliers with differential bargaining power makes no
qualitative difference to our results as long as the firm has a larger bargaining power relative
to the internal supplier than the external supplier due to ownership and authority.
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by transfer payment P ∗1 = (1− β1)(R−R2). Correspondingly, H obtains R2 −
P2 + β1(R−R2) and M1 gets (1− β1)(R−R2).
Next we move back to the initial stage bargaining between H andM2. With
full knowledge and rational expectations, H and M2 bargain over R − P ∗1 . If
trade with M2 takes place, H secures R−P ∗1 − P2 and M2 obtains P2. If there
is no trade with M2, H can at least reap β1R1 from single outsourcing with
M1, while M2 gets nothing. The Nash bargaining yields P ∗2 = (1 − β2)(R −
P ∗1 − β1R1), which can be rewritten as P ∗2 = (1 − β2)[β1R + (1 − β1)R2 −
β1R1]. As a result, H, M1 and M2 obtain profits of πH = R − P ∗1 − P ∗2 − h =
β1β2R + β1(1 − β2)R1 + β2(1 − β1)R2 − h, πM1 = (1 − β1)(R − R2) − m1,
and πM2 = (1 − β2)[β1R + (1 − β1)R2 − β1R1] −m2, respectively. The whole
problem becomes H, M1 and M2 choosing h, m1 and m2 at date 1 to maximize
πH , πM1 , and πM2 , respectively.
Interestingly, we find that the sequence of bargaining does matter:
Proposition 1: For bi-sourcing to be sustainable, H must negotiate with the
softer party (M2) earlier than the tougher one (M1); otherwise the bi-sourcing
scenario would be reduced to single outsourcing.
We know that the component supplier who is negotiated later contributes to
the total revenue on top of the inputs made by the supplier that is negotiated
earlier. Given the concavity of the production revenue function, the late mover
always contributes less to total revenue for a given amount of inputs and in turn
claims a lower marginal revenue than the early mover does. If H negotiates
with M2 later than M1, M2 always encounters a lower marginal revenue than
M1 does. Since M1, as the first mover, equates its marginal revenue with the
constant marginal cost in equilibrium, M2 will have a marginal revenue that is
always lower than the marginal cost, which will depress her incentive to make
investments and reduce bi-sourcing to single outsourcing.
V.Choice between Bi− sourcing and Single Outsourcing
Finally, the headquarter H chooses between bi-sourcing and single outsourc-
ing at date 0. It turns out that bi-sourcing is more efficient.
Proposition 2: Bi-sourcing generates more profits than single outsourcing
does.
In bi-sourcing, H can obtain cross threat effect in negotiating with M1 and
M2. With M2 as a backup, H can diminish the holdup problem of M1. More-
over, with M1 as an outside option, H can also force M2 to make relationship-
specific investments. Consequently, H achieves a better bargaining position in
bi-sourcing than in single outsourcing, and her supply of h also increases. As
h and m are strategic complements, this in return stimulates the component
provision by M1 and M2, which further enhances the total profits.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, we provide one explanation for the superiority of bi-sourcing:
the cross threat in negotiation in bi-sourcing helps the firm to mitigate the
holdup problem of outsourcing, keeps the incentive of both internal and external
suppliers and improves economic efficiency.
3
Appendix
[Sketch of Proof to Proposition 1] As the bargaining structure is sym-
metric, if H negotiates with M1 earlier than M2, we can write out the first
order conditions for H, M1 and M2 as β1β2
∂f(h,m)
∂h + β1(1 − β2)
∂f(h,m1)
∂h +
β2(1− β1)
∂f(h,m2)
∂h = 1, (1− β1)
h
β2
∂f(h,m)
∂m1
+ (1− β2)
∂f(h,m1)
∂m1
i
= 1, and (1−
β2)
∂f(h,m)
∂m2
= 1 respectively. As β2
∂f(h,m)
∂m1
+ (1 − β2)
∂f(h,m1)
∂m1
> ∂f(h,m)∂m2 and
1−β1 > 1−β2, the last two equations cannot be satisfied simultaneously. Since
M1 moves first to choose the optimal investment, the late mover M2 always
faces the situation of (1−β2)
∂f(h,m)
∂m2
< 1. Thus m2 = 0. It is easy to show that
if H negotiates with M2 earlier than M1, the three first order conditions can be
satisfied simultaneously. QED.
[Sketch of Proof to Proposition 2] In single outsourcing, the first order
conditions for H and M1 are β1
∂f(h,m1)
∂h = 1 and (1 − β1)
∂f(h,m1)
∂m1
= 1 respec-
tively. The former equation generates the headquarter’s reaction fuction to the
component supplier as hS = hS(m;β1), while the latter equation generates the
supplier’s reaction function to the headquarter as mS = mS(h;β1).
In bi-sourcing, when H negotiates with M2 earlier than with M1, the first
order conditions for H, M2 and M1 are β1β2
∂f(h,m)
∂h + β1(1 − β2)
∂f(h,m1)
∂h +
β2(1− β1)
∂f(h,m2)
∂h = 1, (1− β2)
h
β1
∂f(h,m)
∂m2
+ (1− β1)
∂f(h,m2)
∂m2
i
= 1, and (1−
β1)
∂f(h,m1+m2)
∂m1
= 1, respectively. Rewrite the equation for H as T ∂f(h,m)∂h =
1,where T = β1β2 + β1(1 − β2)
∂f(h,m1)/∂h
∂f(h,m)/∂h + β2(1 − β1)
∂f(h,m2)/∂h
∂f(h,m)/∂h . From
the first order conditions for H and M1, we can obtain the reaction functions
of the headquarter and the two component suppliers as hB = hB(m;T ) and
mB = mB(h;β1) respectively.
The component suppliers’ reaction functions coincide under bi-sourcing and
single outsourcing, i.e., mS = mB = g(h;β1), while the headquarter’s reaction
functions differ only in the exogenous variable, i.e. h = h(m; i), i = T for
bi-sourcing and i = β1 for single outsourcing. It is easy to show that the
reaction functions h(m; i) and g(h;β1) are increasing and concave in m and h
respectively, and h(m; i) is increasing in the exogenous variable i.
Since ∂f(h,m1)∂h +
∂f(h,m2)
∂h >
∂f(h,m)
∂h holds by assumption, we have T >
β1. The intersection point of the two reaction functions under bi-sourcing lies
northeast to that under single outsourcing, which means at the second-best
equilibrium we have hB∗ > hS∗, and mB∗ > mS∗. This finally leads to higher
revenue and profits under bi-sourcing than under single outsourcing. QED.
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